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What explains American foreign policy in the Arab World? What does the US reaction to the 
Arab Spring tell us about Washington’s presumed determination to promote democracy in the 
Arab world? This thesis operationalizes these research questions by looking at three case studies: 
the US reaction to the 2006 Lebanese-Israeli War, the US reaction to the 2011 Bahraini uprising, 
and the March 2011 uprising against Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in Syria. It does so by 
interrogating Washington’s policies toward these three cases against the geopolitical calculations 
of realism and the legacy of neoconservatism. The thesis also spells out the implications of the 
decisions taken in the aforementioned three cases on the US’s image in the region and its 
geopolitical interests in the Middle East. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
AMERICA: FRIEND OR FOE? 
 
1.1 Introduction 
There is an uninterrupted debate in the United States about the utility of democracy 
promotion in the Middle East. This plan, created after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 
is referred to as President George W. Bush’s Freedom Agenda. Bush was convinced that 
authoritarian regimes are a threat to the United States and consequently, as he stated in his 
second inaugural speech, the liberty of the American people “depends on the success of liberty in 
other lands”. This concept became the central driving logic of Bush’s Freedom Agenda. The 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 challenged one of the most fundamental themes of US Foreign Policy: 
the idea that the stability of Middle Eastern authoritarian states ensured the protection of 
American security and American geopolitical interests (Carothers and Ottaway 2005). This 
theme remains debatable even after the uprisings of the Arab Spring since December 2010. 
Animosity toward the US government has steadily increased in the Arab world since the 
promulgation of the Freedom Agenda. This animosity has only increased with the uprisings of 
the Arab Spring. There is no debate in regards to the weakness of US foreign policy. There is a 
continuous debate, however, over the US government’s true intentions and ultimate goals in the 
Middle East. This debate revolves around a number of questions: was the US government serious 
about spreading democracy throughout the Arab world? Does the US government genuinely 
want a ‘democratic’ Middle East? Alternatively, does it simply use the ‘fight for democracy’ as a 
tool to advance what are otherwise mere geopolitical interests? With the Arab Spring a good 
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three years underway, it seems the United States has oscillated between a number of different 
policies as it has tried to deal with the transformations wrought by the popular uprisings. Albeit 
the United States once focused solely on changing certain policies within authoritarian regimes, 
it later embraced a selective policy of regime change, only to find itself having to accommodate 
itself to the tenacity of authoritarianism in some states. With this general loss in American 
confidence, there comes a need for major changes in US foreign policy, changes that involve 
dealing with both sides of the issues at hand (Brzezinski and Scowcroft, 15). 
In terms of standard of governances and their role it played in sparking the Arab Spring 
in 2011, it was a major factor. However, countries such as Tunisia, where the Arab Spring first 
evolved, had high governance scores. The Arab Spring is largely the result of the Arab States’ 
inability to handle the economic and political pressures generated by a largely youth population 
in the context of crony capitalists economies. As numbers increase and demands for jobs, 
housing and food increase, governments must create a strategy that will satisfy each of its 
peoples’ needs (Althani, 17). In deeply divided societies, when governments fail to serve the 
needs of the people, what begins as a popular, national protest soon evolves into a sectarian fight. 
In today’s Arab region, as Gregory Gause explains, the “salience of sectarianism rises as the 
power of the state declines” (2003). It is the collapse of state institutions that has triggered the 
kind of sectarian, ethnic, religious, and tribal conflicts that one sees in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and 
Iraq. 
 
1.2 Neocons vs. Realists 
 When the neoconservative agenda first emerged, four common principles were associated 
with it: a concern with democracy, human rights and more generally the internal politics of 
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states; a belief that US military power can be used for moral purposes; an uncertainty about the 
ability of international law and institutions to solve serious security problems and the anarchy of 
the international system; and finally, a view that ambitious “social engineering often leads to 
unexpected consequences and often undermines its own ends.” Based on these principles, it can 
be concluded that the Bush Administration’s decisions were “errors of prudential judgment or 
policy implementation, rather than reflections of underlying principles” (Fukuyama, 5). 
Neoconservatism is based on these coherent principles that during the Cold War yielded 
levelheaded policies both in the United States and around the world. There were many 
interpretations made based on these principles. During the 1990’s these principles were used to 
justify the use of force as a basis of US foreign policy. As a result, these principles eventually led 
to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2006 Lebanese-Israeli War. When the neoconservatives 
regained power after the 2000 US Presidential elections, US Foreign Policy included notions of 
regime change, hegemony, ‘unipolarity’, preemption and American intelligence. Because the 
basic principles of neoconservatives that emerged during the Cold War are subject to many 
interpretations, “the administration’s foreign policy did not flow ineluctably from the views of 
earlier generations of people who considered themselves neoconservatives” (Fukuyama, 68).  
Neoconservatism’s coherent set of ideas, arguments and conclusions come from 
experience that should be judged on its own merits, not on the basis of the ethnic or religious 
identity of those who espouse those ideas. The Bush Administration’s main focus was on regime 
change, which became evident during the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. This 
is based on the assumption that regimes that threaten their own citizens irrationally are likely to 
do the same to foreigners. As a result, any attempts to alter the behavior of totalitarian regimes 
through external prizes or punishments will always be less successful than changing the original 
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nature of the regime. Neocons, such as Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and David Feith, believe 
that the United States is the most powerful nation in the world and “America can use its power to 
reshape the world to suit its interests. In short, they believe in big-stick diplomacy, which is why 
the Bush doctrine privileges military power over diplomacy” (Mearsheimer, 2). These 
neoconservatives had no true interest in implementing and spreading democracy throughout the 
Middle East. The 2003 invasion of Iraq is a perfect example. The US government “never 
explained in detail how democracy was going to take root in the Middle East, where there was 
hardly any history of democracy” (Mearsheimer, 4). Realism, on the other hand, deals with the 
notion that all nations, regardless of regime, struggle for power. Realists do not believe that 
liberal democracy is a universal form of government or that its basic human values are greater to 
those basic human values found in nondemocratic societies. Realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, 
James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, advised against using power to spread democracy, out of fear 
that this will lead to war and instability. Realists such as Scowcroft argued that the United States 
uses a one-sided, biased approach in dealing with foreign policy issues, specifically those dealing 
with Israel and the rest of the Arab world. The US government deals “with thought processes and 
institutions geared for that one end of the telescope” (Brzezinski and Scowcroft, 3). Realism 
plays a major role in the Obama administration’s approach to the Arab world, and seems to have 
guided US policy toward the Arab world after the uprisings of the Arab Spring. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 What explains American foreign policy in the Arab World especially after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and the 2010 Arab uprisings? How does the debate between Realism and Neo-
Conservatism in the US affect Washington’s policy toward the Arab world? The Freedom 
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Agenda had its greatest objectives set in the Middle East. Ironically, this same agenda had its 
greatest sense of failure in the region that it so desperately wanted to change, but namely to 
protect the American homeland. The Freedom Agenda, “an undertaking rich in rhetoric and 
bombast and poor on substance, has been an unqualified disaster. It has not helped bring about 
change in the region, but it has undermined US credibility” (Traub, 2009). Hence, “the impact of 
EU and US programs and policies have thus far failed to make a positive contribution to 
democratic change … Western policies reflect an unwillingness to hold MENA governments 
accountable for their political performance, and to sanction those who resist reform, or, more 
commonly, engage in sham reforms that simply reinforce authoritarian systems of control” 
(Heydemann 2010, 2). The US never officially expressed its disappointment with the tyrannical 
actions of authoritarian regimes until after the 2011 Arab Spring commenced. The American 
administration avoided putting pressure on authoritarian regimes to undertake specific reforms. 
In particular, the rise of Hamas in 2006 and of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2005 (Yehiav 2006; 
Heydemann 2010) made US policymakers more anxious about the prospects of democratization 
and the ensuing empowerment of Islamist anti-American and anti-Israeli actors (Chomsky and 
al-Achkar 2008, 46). 
The US administration limited its democratization efforts to technical programs that 
focused on building civil societies and all sorts of capacities in the region while failing to tackle 
the structural problems of political power. A tremendous amount of funding was provided to the 
civil society sector. Foreign aid agencies associated the existence of non-governmental 
organizations with the strength of civil societies that engage in public accountability and 
democratic processes (Jamal 2007). In the Arab world, the underlying assumption of this pattern 
was challenged by empirical facts. Arab regimes conquered the non-governmental organization 
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sector “to contain the deepening of civil societies and to erode their capacity to challenge 
political authority” (Heydemann 2007, 8). As a result, civil societies not only combined 
authoritarian forms of governance but also failed to promote democracy in the region. Those 
who are opposed to this approach argue that the “the path to democracy in the Arab world leads 
not through civil societies, but through the reform of Arab states” (Ibid, 8). 
The aforementioned raises one more question: What does the US reaction to the Arab 
Spring teach us about Washington’s determination to promote democracy in the Arab world? 
The United States’ response to the Arab Spring proves that the United States is willing to 
promote democracy where it serves its interest, but does not support the uprisings in those 
authoritarian states considered important to US geopolitical and global interests. In March 2011, 
the Obama administration announced that the US had one strategy in mind, in response to the 
uprisings that were taking place in the Arab world: “help keep longtime allies who are willing to 
reform in power, even if that means the full democratic demands of their newly emboldened 
citizens might have to wait” (Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2011). In certain countries such as 
Egypt, Libya, and Syria, the United States pushed for immediate regime change and supported 
the uprisings. In other countries, however, such as Bahrain, the United States pushed for 
protesters to work with the existing leaders and work towards “regime alteration”, as opposed to 
“regime change”. Libya is another example in which the United States started out against regime 
change, and later decided to act against Colonel Moammar Gadhafi and criticize him for the acts 
of violence committed against his people. 
The Obama administration, like the previous US administrations, further proves that the 
United States works solely in terms of strategic interests. US foreign policy, specifically towards 
the Middle East, is inconsistent and varies from country to country. One of Obama’s 
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administration officials released a statement stating that the Obama administration believes that 
“there is a need for political, economic and social reform, but the particular approach will be 
country by country” (Wall Street Journal: March 5, 2011). Washington’s policy concerning 
authoritarian regime in Syria best expressed this policy stance. The Obama administration’s 
approach to the popular uprising in Syria has prioritized the fallout effects of regime collapse and 
its geopolitical consequences over the rights and the aspirations of the Syrian peoples.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
A qualitative, case-studies approach best explains the United States government’s true 
intentions within the Middle East since the 2006 Lebanese-Israeli War and the 2011 Arab 
Spring. This approach uses numerous articles, scholarly journals and books published on the 
debate over the US government’s genuine interest in promoting democracy throughout the region 
versus the belief that the US government was and is still interested in more sinister geopolitical 
objectives. Most of the literature published on this debate argues that realism is the main factor 
that drives the promotion of American democracy in the Middle East; the United States’ main 
objective is seeking out ways to gain power in the region. 
The research question is operationalized using three case studies: the US reaction to the 
2006 Lebanese-Israeli War, the US reaction to the 2011 Bahraini uprising against King Hamad’s 
monarchy and the March 2011 uprising against Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. Explaining the very 
different US reactions to the uprisings in Bahrain and Syria, and to the 2006 Lebanon war, helps 
explain the drivers of US foreign policy in the Arab world before as well as after the uprisings. It 
further validates the fact that the United States supports democracy and regime change in those 
areas where it serves its geopolitical interests. 
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The 2006 Lebanese-Israeli War is a case that exemplified how Lebanon played a spoiler 
role as a means for the United States to play a greater role in the region. The United States’ 
stance on the war supports the theory that the US will work for the implementation of 
democracy, without the meddling of foreign countries, only in areas where it will gain 
geopolitical advances. The 2006 war showed the US policy has the same theory both before the 
2011 Arab uprisings and after. The cases of Bahrain and Syria exemplify this theory, post Arab 
Spring. In the case of Bahrain, the United States government completely  overlooked the human 
rights violations taking place in the country. Because the current Al-Khalifa regime worked in 
cooperation with Washington and worked to the US government’s advantage, the regime was 
fully supported and protected by the US and its allies. The United States not only has its Fifth 
Fleet stationed in Bahrain, but also signed a Free Trade Agreement with the country in 2006. 
This only further proved the close ties between the two.  
In the case of Syria, however, the United States is fully opposed to Assad’s regime. They 
are not only verbally showing their outward support the opposition, but Washington is also 
supplying arms to the opposition. Because Assad and his allies do now work in cooperation with 
the US government, it is in Washington’s best interest to support regime change in Syria. This 
way, there could be a possibility of replacing Assad with a ‘puppet of the West’. It is in the 
United States’ best interest to continue supporting the overthrow of Assad and supplying the 
opposition with weapons. This method also deters the focus of Washington’s enemies (Syria, 
Iran, Al Qaeda, etc.) from attacking the US and its allies, for now. 
 This thesis will examine the Bahraini revolutions and the ways in which the US and its 
allies, such as Saudi Arabia, took a firm stance with the royal monarchy, crushing any attempts 
of the opposition to protest for equal rights and opportunities. On the other hand, the thesis will 
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take a close look at the Syrian revolutions and the strong stance the US took with the opposition, 
greatly criticizing the Assad regime. This thesis will also examine the ways in which the US used 
Lebanon as a channel to gain momentum in the region, specifically against the Syrian regime. 
The various revolutions of the Arab Spring each have their unique characteristics, but all have 
one message to deliver: “al-sha‘b yurid isqat al-nizam” or the people want to overthrow the 
regime. This is the popular theme throughout the Arab Spring. Unfortunately, the United States 
and its allies have taken it upon themselves to play a great role in deciding which authoritarian 
regimes are overthrown and which ones survive. 
 
1.5 Map of the Thesis 
 This thesis is divided into five chapters. The next chapter reviews the debate between 
contending theoretical explanations of US foreign policy in the Middle East. It discusses the 
discourse on democracy promotion in the Middle East, focusing primarily on the debate between 
the realists and the neoconservatives. The third chapter discusses the 2006 Lebanese-Israeli War 
and the events leading up to it. Chapter four compares US policy in the Arab world in two 
contexts: Syria and Bahrain. The final chapter spells out the policy implications of the findings 
of the thesis and the impacts of successive US governments’ policies on America’s image in the 
region. 
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Chapter Two: 
Discourse on Democracy: 
Neocons vs. Realists 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the debate between contending theoretical explanations of US 
foreign policy in the Middle East. It discusses the discourse on democracy promotion in the 
Middle East, focusing primarily on the debate between realists and neoconservatives. These two 
theories cannot be more different. The key difference is that realism values power above all else, 
while neoconservatism espouses the idea that the world acts in accordance with natural law; 
anything not conforming to natural law is evil and must be fought. This chapter will explore 
these two theories, their tenants and what affects they have/had on American foreign policy in 
the Middle East. One thing, however, is clear: neoconservatism has had significant impacts on 
American foreign policy; especially in recent years. 
 
2.2 Neoconservatism 
 Neoconservatism emerged in the United States at the height of the Cold War around 
1950. However, while parts of Neoconservative thought can be seen in American foreign policy 
prior to Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, the watershed moment for neoconservatism came 
during Reagan’s presidency. Specifically, that moment on 8 March 1983 in a speech in which 
Reagan characterized the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as the “Evil Empire” 
(Kerwick, 2013). Such thinking was reaffirmed during George W. Bush’s presidency when he 
characterized Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an “Axis of Evil.”  
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Joshua Muravchik argues that neoconservatism is defined by four distinguishing 
characteristics: it is moralist, internationalist, trusts in the efficacy of military force and believes 
in democracy at both home and abroad (Murachik, 2007). These characteristics are unpacked 
below.  Neoconservatism sees communism as evil. Hence, the USSR was seen as the 
embodiment of evil. Such a binary perspective, which seeks to characterize all nations, 
phenomena, groups, philosophies and figures is driven by the belief that all things in the world 
are either black or white. In other words, all things are either good or evil; but never anywhere in 
between. Political figures such as Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, and Osama bin Laden 
are never considered to be anything but evil in such a philosophy. Neoconservatives also believe 
that the United States is a force for good in the world. Consequently, sentiment and self-interest 
are, for American Neoconservatives, one in the same.  
 Neoconservatism’s outlook is internationalist. Simply put, neoconservatism argues that 
threats should be confronted early and that, once engaged, the United States (US) should never 
back down. Here again, binary thinking dominates the Neoconservative outlook. In an argument 
that is reminiscent of the Domino Theory, Neoconservatives believe that evil promoted through 
political and economic policies tolerated in one place will be repeated in others. 
Neoconservatives also believe the reverse is also true: that political and economic policies can 
also create a virtuous cycle. Neoconservatives trust in the ability of military force to achieve their 
ends. In fact, in contrast to other schools of thought, neoconservatism believes in the first use of 
military force. Military force plays a role in the spread of democracy. Finally, Neoconservatives 
believe in democracy as a force for good. In the mind of a neoconservative, the US is a 
democracy and the US is good. Therefore, democracy - especially the American type - must 
spread throughout the world. 
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 Stephen Halper (2005) describes Neoconservatism as untied around three common 
themes. Halper argues that neoconservatives belief that humanity is defined by choices between 
good and evil. Hence, like Muravchik, Halper argues that neoconservatism is moralist. 
Specifically, Halper suggests that neoconservatives believe the measure of character is found in 
the willingness of good to confront evil. Halper also argues that neoconservatism believes that 
force is the fundamental determinant of relations between states. Specifically, the willingness to 
use force - not just the possession of it - is mentioned as a key factor. Again, like Muravchik, 
Halper suggests that neoconservatives believe in the efficacy of military action. A distinguishing 
characteristic between Halper and Muravchik is that Halper highlights the focus of American 
foreign policy on the Middle East. Halper notes that the Middle East is the principal theater for 
American interests overseas. However, like Muravchik, Halper highlights the internationalist 
character of neoconservatism and its belief that a world made more like America is a world that 
is ultimately safer for America. 
 
2.3 The Ideological Roots of Neoconservatism 
 Norman Podhoretz, Leo Strauss and Allan Bloom are some of the ideological forefathers 
of neoconservatism. Through these men, we can trace the history of neoconservatism’s 
beginnings. Writing in the middle of the 20th century, these men were heavily influenced by 
World War I, World War II, Totalitarianism and the Cold War.  
 Leo Strauss, born in 1899, is one of the most significant figures in Neoconservatism. In 
his 1953 book, Natural Rights and History, Strauss argued that natural rights do exist and that 
there is such a thing as an absolute good. Strauss argues that those who disagree with this 
perspective embrace relativism and nihilism. He identifies such people as “historicists” (Strauss 
13 
 
1953), or people who realize the acceptance of a universal principle has unsettling, even 
revolutionary, consequences. Hence, through Strauss, we can first identify Neoconservatism’s 
belief in absolutes; that something is good or evil, or “with us or with the terrorists.”    
 Allan Bloom, the author of The Closing of the American Mind, characterizes the 
American achievement of liberal democracy as one of the “highest and most extreme 
achievements of the rational quest for good life according to nature.” Bloom argues that 
American political structure relies upon the use of rational principles based upon natural right, 
building upon Strauss’ work.  Bloom’s argument that the US is a symbol of culture high and 
extreme human achievement can also be seen in another light. As part of the neoconservatism 
embrace of American exceptionalism, the US is special because of its ideas. Liberal democracy 
is seen as founded on natural right and as an American idea; hence it is both good and something 
the US should evangelize via democracy promotion. These are the roots of the Neoconservative 
push for democratization and Bush’s adoption of the Freedom Agenda, as his effort at 
emphasizing the spread of democracy around the world; particularly in the Middle East.  
 Norman Podhoretz is one of Neoconservatism’s most important thinkers. He produced 
over ten books and served for thirty-five years as the editor of Commentary magazine. Through 
those works, he shaped neoconservative thinking. In fact, Nathan Abrams argues that Podhoretz 
is the intellectual who guided neoconservatism through its rise, peak, and fall. Rather than 
contribute ideas to neoconservative thought, he validated them, playing a very unique role in the 
neoconservatism thought process. Abrams described Podhoretz as turning “Commentary into an 
extension of his own personality.” Podhoretz personally had the ability to introduce ideas into 
Neoconservatism; in effect, he had control over Neoconservatism’s DNA. 
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2.4 Neoconservatives and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
Muravchik notes that American neoconservatism has four essential strategic priorities in 
the U.S., including stabilizing Iraq, preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, enlarging 
the US military so that strategic decisions can be based on the use of military force, and fostering 
democracy in the Middle East (Muravchik 2007). The emphasis on these priorities can be seen in 
the Surge, American policies towards Iran, and US efforts of promoting democracy in the region. 
Perhaps because of American budget cuts via sequestration and the Obama administration’s 
emphasis on other global priorities as well as de-escalation in the Middle East, the growth of the 
US military is a goal that has yet to be seen. 
Halper notes that Neoconservatism has put its ideas into practice by analyzing 
international issues in binaries of  good and evil. It is as if neoconservatives believe that they, 
and they alone, hold the moral high ground and that to disagree with their positions is to accept 
defeat. These beliefs also make Neoconservatism dubious of diplomacy as well as realism, 
pragmatic analysis, and any thought that embraces shades of grey. Neoconservatism, it seems, 
wants to categorize rather than invest time and energy into thinking.  
Additionally, by focusing on American unipolarity, the use of military force is not seen as 
the option of last resort, rather it is viewed as the first option. In other words, Neoconservatives 
embrace American unipolarity and seek to further it through the use of military force. This 
makes Neoconservatives hostile towards non-military institutions and antagonistic towards 
international treaties, agreements and norms. Hence, international criticism only affirms 
American virtue in Neoconservative eyes. 
Democracy promotion was a key element of US foreign policy after World War II. The 
U.S. worked hard to stabilize European democracies through the Marshall Plan and build what 
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Mark Lagon, a Senior Fellow for Human Rights at the Council of Foreign Relations, described 
as a “bulwark within which Italy, West Germany, Portugal, and Spain democratized” (Lagon 
2011). At the time, democracy promotion did not stop the U.S. from supporting dictatorships. 
However, after 11 September 2001, President Bush made the democratization of the Middle East 
through the use of military force a key American strategic objective. It seems that Bush and 
Neoconservatives believed that democracy, a form of government that emphasizes the right of a 
people to choose, can be imposed upon a society through force. That contradiction may be one of 
the greatest weaknesses of neoconservative thought. 
 
2.5 Realism 
 Realism in international relations argues that the international system is characterized by 
anarchy. In the international system, all states are sovereign and therefore autonomous. The only 
force that binds them is power.  In such a system, power (defined in economic, diplomatic, and 
military terms) is what matters, as power is the capability of a nation to achieve its objectives 
through military, economic and diplomatic means (Mearsheimer 2001). Realism is based on four 
assumptions: survival is the goal of every state; states are rational actors seeking to maximize the 
certainty of their existence; all states possess military capacity but no state knows exactly what 
its neighbors intend; the Great Powers (the nations with the most economic and military power) 
are dominant. 
The first assumption survival, informs us that states are concerned about their security. 
The second assumption, that states are rational actors, means that states will not take actions that 
they believe undermines their own security. The third assumption indicates that all states seek to 
improve their capabilities to secure their interests. However, given that states do not know what 
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capabilities other states possess, all states are subject to the security dilemma. In short, one 
state’s quest to increase its security is another state’s source of insecurity. The fourth assumption, 
that the Great Powers are dominant, highlights the importance of power in international relations. 
As Thucydides wrote thousands of years ago, “the strong do what they have the power to do and 
the weak accept what they have to accept.” 
Realists are divided into two broad camps: Offensive Realists and Defensive Realists. 
Offensive Realists argue that, in order to survive, states must seek to maximize their power 
relative to others (Mearsheimer 2001). In other words, states should seek hegemony if they are in 
a position to do so. This makes sense in that having more power is a good thing from the realist 
perspective, as it ensures the survival of the state. Defensive Realists believe that domination is 
useless, because it will bring states into conflict with their peers. Hence, Defensive Realists 
emphasize the balance of power in an attempt to ensure a roughly equal distribution of power 
among states and balancing and bandwagoning. This will decrease the risks associated with 
states attacking one another (Waltz 1979). 
 
2.6 Realism’s Proponents 
Realism’s major proponents include Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt 
and John Mearsheimer.  In 1948, Morgenthau suggested that realism is based on six principles: 
Politics, like society in general, are governed by objective laws that have their roots in human 
nature; The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of 
international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power; Realism assumes that 
its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category that is universally valid, but 
it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all; Political realism is 
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aware of the moral significance of political action; Political realism refuses to identify the moral 
aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe; The difference, 
then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound. Combined 
together, these principles define many of the features of realism as described by Kenneth Waltz, 
a structural realist (1959); including that the international system is characterized by anarchy, 
that states are self-interested, and that power is what states seek in order to ensure their survival.  
 To suggest that the international system is anarchical simply means that its alternative is 
unordered chaos. The multi-polar, bi-polar, and briefly unipolar (post-Cold War) systems we 
have seen throughout history are just the current and temporary appearance an ever-changing 
system has assured. In such a system, states are always seeking power because only power 
allows them to survive. In such a world, there is no moral law or absolutes, only power and 
survival. That explains the self-interested nature of states (Waltz 1948).  
 In contrast to Waltz, Mearsheimer is an Offensive Realist. According to Mearsheimer 
(2001), the tenants of Offensive Realism are that: Great powers are the preeminent actors in the 
international system which, like defensive realism, is defined by anarchy; All states have some 
degree of offensive military capabilities; States are never certain of the intentions of other states; 
Survival is every state’s primary goal; States are rational actors seeking to maximize their 
chances of survival. 
The difference between Offensive Realism and Defensive Realism is that Offensive 
Realists believe states should actively seek to achieve more power while Defensive Realists 
believe that states usually balance against power or threats but only when threatened. The rise of 
Germany and the British attempts to contain Germany during the late 1800s and early 20th 
century can be analyzed through these two lenses. The British acted in accordance with 
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Defensive Realism while the Germans, under Otto von Bismarck’s leadership, acted in 
accordance with Offensive Realism. In other words, the British sought to preserve their interests, 
while the Germany sought to maximize its national interests. 
 
2.7 How Does Realism Influence U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East? 
 If realists were in charge of foreign policy, Stephen Walt argues that U.S. foreign policy 
would look drastically different than it currently does. In a post to his blog on 30 April 2012, 
Walt argued that a realist foreign policy would have resulted in no war in Iraq, no “Global War 
on Terror”, no nation-building, an adoption of offshore balancing as a strategy, no NATO 
expansion or Balkan adventures during the 1990s as well as no Libyan intervention during the 
Arab Spring. Instead, U.S. foreign policy would be characterized by a growing emphasis on 
China. In short, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has only had elements of realism over the 
past twenty-five years. It is quite clear that neoconservatism was the ideology of the Bush 
administration. Today, it appears that the Obama administration has a more realist bend, as it 
acted in concert with other powers in Libya, avoided involvement in the Syrian Civil War, and 
seeks to diplomatically prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons rather than arguing for 
regime change. 
Be that as it may, it is also clear that neoconservatism has enjoyed significant influence 
over US foreign policy since at least the Reagan years. The adoption of absolutist rhetoric, a 
binary view of the world, and a belief in the efficacy of military force as an option of first resort 
have all dominated US foreign policy since the Reagan Administration. American forces have 
been involved in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, as well as the rest of the former Yugoslavia, 
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Yemen, Panama, Grenada, and many other countries. If a nation wields the world’s largest 
hammer, it seems that it is hard for every problem to not look like a nail.  
Obama’s realism is best exemplified by the US approach to Syria. He has been reluctant 
to do anything in Syria beyond provide the Free Syrian Army with a limited degree of aid and 
make harmless threats. If one steps back and examines the situation, there is clearly an argument 
for the Americans attempting to prolong the conflict as America’s opponents are all fighting and 
dying in Syria – Hezbollah, the Assad regime, Iran, and Islamic extremists are too busy fighting 
and killing each other to fight the U.S. From a purely realist perspective, that is a positive for the 
US, as its enemies are doing the work of defeating each. American power relative to these 
factions is increasing as they weaken each other.  As always, the US is sending other powers to 
do its “dirty work”. 
 Contrast this to President Bush’s logic for invading Iraq. As is common knowledge to 
nearly any competent observer, President Bush wanted to transform Iraq into a democracy, put in 
place based on US interests, which would in turn spread democracy throughout the Middle East, 
with the thinking that more democracy meant the US would be more protected. President Obama 
seems reluctant to become involved in Syria, perhaps mainly because all of America’s opponents 
(Hezbollah, Syria itself, Iran, and Al-Qaeda) are already at war with one another. From a coldly 
realist perspective, there is no need for America to become involved when it is already reaping 
relative gains from a conflict from.  
 Given these differences, it is not surprising that Realists and Neoconservatives view each 
other negatively. Recently, in the cases of Syria and Libya, Neoconservatives have argued that 
the Obama administration is leading from behind. If Obama’s realism were more pronounced, 
neoconservatives may argue that he is a cold, ruthless leader who seeks power at the expense of 
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people’s lives. Realists would counter that, while they would love to act in accordance with a 
moral code, the world does not always allow people to make that choice. Realists would also see 
Neoconservative’s absolutism as inflexible, narrowing the range of options a nation has when 
navigating an international crisis. Considering the failures of neoconservatism during the Bush 
administration, it is not surprising to see the American people elect and then re-elect a president 
with a far different approach. Regardless of the change in approach, US Foreign Policy today 
continues to be a failure in the international realm. Although the “approach” per se has changed, 
the main goal remains the same. The US works in favor of those regimes that support its strategic 
interests, while working against those regimes that pose a threat to its hegemonic power. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 The differences between realists and neoconservatives could not be more stark. Realism 
espouses power as the currency of the international system; that is the only thing that matters. 
There is no natural evolution, law, or order to the world, only anarchy and the struggle of states 
to survive. In contrast, neoconservatism believes in a natural order and that the world acts in 
accordance with ideas of good and evil. Hence, the mindset of decision makers subscribing to 
each ideology is different. A realist will seek to preserve or expand American power, as that is 
the ultimate good for a nation-state, because power ensures survival. A neoconservative will seek 
to re-order the world according to American values because a like-minded world presents no 
threat to the U.S.  
 These fundamental differences may explain US foreign policy in the Middle East over 
the past few years.  Consider the contrast between Bush and Obama. Bush’s presidency was 
defined by neoconservatism – the War on Terror, the Axis of Evil, the invasion of Iraq, and the 
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Freedom Agenda are textbook cases of neoconservative thoughts put into practice. Obama’s 
presidency, however, has been much more difficult to define. He has more judiciously exercised 
American power, often in concert with others, while avoiding ideological entanglements. While 
Obama is not as clearly tied to realism as Bush is to neoconservatism, Obama’s foreign policy 
motivations are far less clear than Bush’s, yet no more successful. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LEBANON: FRIEND OR FOE? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 On February 14, 2005, former Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri was killed in Beirut by a 
suicide bomber carrying 1700 kilograms of explosives. All fingers pointed directly towards 
Syria, which had ruled over Lebanon both directly and indirectly for twenty-nine years. “Syrian 
power was virtually unlimited, its intelligence services and information networks ubiquitous” 
(Young, 2). Syria, however, claimed that it was innocent and the attack was simply part of a 
larger plan to disgrace Assad and the Syrian people. However, why was Syria targeted as the 
main suspect in such a horrendous crime? Syria and the Assad regime feared Hariri’s ulterior 
motives. The most apparent incentive for Syria was that Hariri had the capability to create a 
serious electoral challenge against Syria in the summer 2005 parliamentary elections. There was 
the fear that a Sunni Muslim would, through the elections and Hariri’s growing insolence, could 
weaken the established Syrian order in Lebanon and “indirectly embolden Syria’s own majority 
Sunnis, who since 1970, have lived under an Alawite-dominated minority regime” (Young, 3).   
 The domestic and international pressure that Bashar Al-Assad faced following the 
assassination, was too much for the Syrian president to handle. Two weeks after Hariri’s death, 
Assad paid a visit to Saudi Arabia, where King Abdullah told him that his troops needed to 
withdraw from Lebanon immediately. These sentiments were much different from those 
originally held by Saudi Arabia towards the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War. At the time, 
the Saudis played a vital role in legitimatizing Syria’s intervention in Lebanon. Bashar Al-Assad 
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tried to postpone the withdrawal as much as possible, however, after being threatened that he 
would have to face Saudi hostility should he not withdraw his forces immediately; Assad was 
faced with no other option. Saudi Arabia was convinced that Syria was responsible for Hariri’s 
murder, but in an attempt to maintain peaceful inter-Arab state relations, they avoided any public 
acts of antagonism towards Syria. Syria was required, however, to withdraw from Lebanon at 
once. 
Following the assassination, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese from all different 
religions, political movements and social classes gathered in downtown Beirut’s Martyrs Square. 
This movement was soon after given the label of the Lebanese “Cedar Revolution”, receiving 
both domestic and international recognition, and of course sparking the interest of the United 
States of America and then president, George W. Bush. Bush immediately took this opportunity 
to insist that a “democratic wave” was taking place and would help his Freedom Agenda gain 
legitimacy, after its terrible failure in Iraq. This chapter examines UN Resolution 1559, the 2005 
assassination of Rafik Al-Hariri, the 2006 July War in Lebanon, UN Resolution 1701 and the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon. It argues that the United States government used Lebanon in order 
to advance its geostrategic objectives and to put pressure on outside countries, such as Syria and 
Iran, in order to gain its own personal interests within the region. 
 
3.2 May 2000: Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon 
Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 without a formal agreement gave 
Hezbullah a new sense of empowerment. The three main issues that the movement was forced to 
deal with were the continued maintenance and development of its weapons, the resistance, and 
blocking any attempt to disarm it. Hezbullah’s justifications for the existence of the resistance 
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movement prior to the withdrawal had become obsolete. Hassan Nasrallah was forced to devise 
new arguments in order to justify the “necessity of the armed resistance after the withdrawal and 
to market them within the community and the Lebanese system” (Eitan, 233). Talks concerning 
Hezbullah’s role after the Israeli withdrawal began many months prior to the withdrawal and 
continued after the 2006 July War. Hezbullah “held a consistent line of propaganda, claiming 
that its relations with Israel had nothing to do with the political circumstances and that even if 
Israel did withdraw its forces, Hezbullah would continue regarding it as an illegitimate entity that 
must disappear” (Azani, 224). The Israeli withdrawal, according to Hezbullah, proved that the 
movement was implementing the correct strategies against Israel and there was no reason for 
Hezbullah to disarm. The night before the Israeli withdrawal, the movement’s highest officials 
were primarily focused on what would need to occur, if a peace agreement was signed between 
Lebanon and Israel. It was then, that Hassan Nasrallah explained that Hezbullah would not 
support any peace deals with Israel and would fully support the Palestinian cause, assisting the 
Palestinian people in their struggle for the freedom of Palestine. On the contrary, however, other 
high-profile Shiite officials in Lebanon, including Sheikh Muhhamad Mahdi Shams al-Din and 
Nabih Berri, thought that Hezbullah should not be an exception and should absolutely disarm 
itself, just like all other groups in Lebanon were forced to do (Alagha 2006). 
 The rigidness that the movement faced back in the 1990s decreased after the 2000 Israeli 
withdrawal. On the one hand, there was the ultimate goal of fighting against Israel and 
completely demolishing the Israeli army, and on the other hand, there was the possibility of 
using the victory to support the transformation of Lebanon into an Islamic republic. This tension 
and the fact that its support for continuing its activity against Israel by using its old strategies had 
decreased and motivated Hassan Nasrallah to choose his classic “walking on the brink” strategy 
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(Ansari, 138). He created new ways by which to justify the continued existence of Hezbullah, 
reduced the amount of direct actions taken against Israel, and increased indirect actions by using 
Palestinian ‘terrorist’ organizations. Hassan Nasrallah’s new strategies captured the interest and 
support of Syrian president Bashar Al–Assad, who fully supported Hezbullah’s possession of 
weapons so long as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remained unresolved (Azani, 226).  The 
withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Forces from Lebanon in May 2000, without a formal 
agreement, was viewed as a victory of Hezbullah’s new strategies.  The Israeli government, on 
the other hand, claimed that they decided to carry out the withdrawal based on United Nations 
Security Council resolution 425: 
Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence 
of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; calls upon Israel 
immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and 
withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory; decides, in light of the request 
of the Government of Lebanon to establish immediately under its authority a United 
Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal 
of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security (UN Resolution 425) 
 
After the 2000 Israeli withdrawal was complete and the Israeli Defense Forces vacated 
southern Lebanon, there was a shift in the structure of the Lebanese government—there was an 
increase in Hezbullah parliament members and Hassan Nasrallah “declared that Hezbullah was 
an Islamic movement while simultaneously acting as a Lebanese national party. He called for 
national unity, for supporting the resistance, and for investing an effort for releasing Lebanese 
prisoners imprisoned in Israel” (Azani, 227). 
After the IDF withdrew from Lebanon, tensions grew within the country: Hezbullah, 
Syria and the Lebanese government were beginning to compete for power over the country and 
its citizens. Hezbullah’s independent activity in Lebanon and in the regional arena embarrassed 
the Lebanese government and reflected upon the relations of the movement with the government 
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of Lebanon throughout that period. The Lebanese government was required to disarm the 
movement and to face accusations from Israel and the United States concerning the movement’s 
involvement with terrorism. Despite the Lebanese government’s outward support for Hezbullah 
and the need to continue the resistance, the relations between the two were tense and were 
characterized as unstable all along that period. Hezbullah’s involvement in the Lebanese political 
system laid the foundation for the government’s claims concerning national support of the 
resistance and exposed it to criticism, as well as pressure from both within the government and 
outside the government. The constant debate that took place concerned the fact that the Lebanese 
government was required to fulfill its responsibility of disarming the movement and sending the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to southern Lebanon (Mannes 2004, 154-155).   
Syria, until then in control of Lebanon, was starting to weaken. The 2003 US invasion of 
Iraq triggered a period of US-Syrian rivalry within Lebanon. “US pressure on Syria was part of a 
more ambitious strategy to reshuffle the geopolitics of the Middle East and neutralize Israel’s 
enemies” (Salloukh 2009, 134). The United States wanted to loosen Syria’s grip over Lebanon.  
On April 12, 2003, the US Congress passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty 
Restoration Act, followed by a list of US demands presented to Syrian president Bashar Al-
Assad, which were discussed in detail in the chapter three. Colin Powell presented these 
demands in an effort to guarantee that Syrian rule in Lebanon would slowly dwindle in the 
coming months. 
Another major shift in the Lebanese parliament was the election of Syria’s rival, Rafik 
Al-Hariri. Hariri’s election as prime minister led to increased tensions within the Lebanese 
political system. In October 2004, Hariri and his cabinet members resigned as a protest against 
Syrian intervention in Lebanon’s policy-making orders and the decision to extend President 
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Emile Lahoud’s presidency to a third term. On February 14, 2005, Hariri was assassinated in a 
car bombing, in which Lebanese officials accused Syria of being involved and thus, forced Syria 
to withdraw from Lebanon in April 2005. Following these incidents, Syria’s ties with Hezbullah 
continued to strengthen, in an effort to maintain its interests in Lebanon’s policies; Syrian 
support for Hezbullah strengthened the movement. Both Syria and Hezbullah were on the same 
page when it came to the Lebanese political system. This was especially clear when the mostly 
pro-Western ‘March 14’ coalition was formed under the leadership of Saad Al-Hariri and Fouad 
Siniora, and known for its verbal attacks towards Syria. While Hezbullah’s role as an influential 
political party in the Lebanese government and amongst the Lebanese people continued to gain 
popularity, the Syria-Hezbullah alliance continued to strengthen as well. Thus, Syria’s opinions 
have a major influence and play a great factor in Hezbullah’s foreign policy decisions, as well as 
in domestic politics. More importantly, Syria is the geostrategic link between Hezbullah and 
Iran. Because Syria borders Lebanon, it has been the conduit and channel through which Iranian 
weapons could reach Hezbullah (Slavin, 14).  
 In May 2005, parliamentary elections were held in Lebanon, in which the anti-Syrian 
members, led by Saad Al-Hariri “received 72 out of 128 parliament seats…Sunni leader, Fouad 
Siniora, who assembled the government, gained sweeping support in the parliament” (Azani, 
230). It was during this period that the United States wanted to take advantage of the situation. 
The US wanted to pull Lebanon away from the Syria-Iran alliance, dragging Lebanon under its 
own wing (Salloukh 2009, 141). Siniora had two main goals to focus on—encouraging the 
investigation into the murder of Rafik Al-Hariri and determining the role of Hezbullah in respect 
to the Lebanese political system as a whole. In December 2005, the government made a decision 
to go through with a UN led investigation into the murder of Hariri. This decision led to the 
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resignation of the Shia ministers, and once again, Lebanon’s government was made a mockery of 
in front of the world. The 2006 July War uncovered the extreme tensions between the Hariri led 
March 14 coalition and the Hezbullah led March 8 coalition. 
 
3.3 UN Resolution 1559 & The Assassination of Rafik Al-Hariri 
On September 2, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed UN Resolution 1559, 
which called for the strict respect of Lebanon’s autonomy, territorial integrity, unity and political 
self-governance under the exclusive authority of the government of Lebanon (press release 
SC/8181). The resolution called for a withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon, the disarming 
of Hezbullah and noninterference in domestic Lebanese affairs. It placed great importance on the 
concept of free and fair elections in Lebanon based on the Lebanese constitution created without 
foreign interference. UN Resolution 1559 was clearly directed towards Syrian forces, which 
were forced to withdraw a few months later, following the February 2005 assassination of Hariri. 
The massive truck bomb explosion killed twenty-two other people, including the former 
economic minister, Basil Fuleihan, who had survived the initial blast. The last of all Syrian 
troops left Lebanon on April 26, 2005. 
One day after the passage of UN Resolution 1559, the Lebanese parliament passed an 
amendment to the Lebanese constitution, allowing for the extension of then president, Emile 
Lahoud’s, term in office. Emile Lahoud was a strong ally of Syria and there had been escalating 
tensions within the Lebanese government over Syria’s desire to extend his presidential term. At 
the time Hariri was opposed to this amendment, however, was pressured by Syria to vote in favor 
of it. About a month later, on October 1, 2004, Marwan Hamadeh survived a car bomb attack 
near his home; Hamadeh was a former telecommunications minister and a member of 
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parliament, who had close ties with Walid Jumblatt and Hariri. The attempted assassination was 
seen as one of the first warnings that Syria would not accept the growing resistance to its rule in 
Lebanon, amid signs that Hariri was strengthening his ties with opposition members critical of 
Syria in the “run-up” to the parliamentary elections that were scheduled for summer 2005. 
Following Hariri’s February 14, 2005 assassination, a series of events occurred leading 
up to the formation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. However, it took nearly four years, the 
collapse of the Lebanese government and the 2006 July War, before the investigation officially 
began on March 1, 2009. The United Nations established its International Independent 
Investigation Commission in April 2005 and in August of that same year four former Lebanese 
generals (Ali al-Hajj, Raymond Azar, Jamil al-Sayyed and Mustafa Hamdan) were detained in 
Roumieh Prison. The four generals were held in custody for approximately four years, before the 
tribunal ordered for their release due to the fact that they “could not be tried within legal 
timeframes” (Daily Star: Timeline of STL Events). In November 2006, a few months after the 
July War, five Hezbullah and Amal movement ministers resigned from then Prime Minister 
Fouad Siniora’s Cabinet. Although the cabinet was dissolved, the remaining members approved 
a draft from the UN on the formation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, calling for a thorough 
investigation into the murder of Rafik Al-Hariri. 
  
3.4 July War  
On July 12, 2006, Hezbullah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers near the Northern border of 
Israel. As a result, Lebanon witnessed thirty-four days of continuous Israeli bombardment. Thus 
began yet another war on Lebanon: 1,200 civilians killed and over 4,000 injured, more than one 
million people displaced, 78 bridges destroyed, 30,000 homes damaged, 15,000 tons of oil 
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spilled on 80 kilometers of Mediterranean coast. The list of devastation is endless. Throughout 
the thirty-four days, countries worldwide were called upon to assist in some sort of ceasefire 
arrangement. The US, however, refused to lead peace talks at first, claiming that Israel and 
Hezbullah should settle their disputes independently. Finally, after many negotiations, on August 
11, 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed UN Resolution 1701 in an effort to end the 
war in Lebanon.  
The resolution, approved by both Lebanese and Israeli governments, called for three main 
factors: 1) The disarmament of Hezbollah (which has yet to happen, almost five years later) 2) 
The withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon, and 3) The deployment of Lebanese soldiers and an 
increased amount of United Nations Interim Forces in Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL).1 Israel never 
declared war on Lebanon and falsely claimed that it attacked only Lebanese governmental 
institutions suspected of assisting Hezbollah in ‘terrorist’ acts. The Lebanese, Israeli and US 
governments all played a role in shaping the conflict. Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora 
called upon US President, George W. Bush to utilize all his efforts to convince Israel to stop its 
attacks on Lebanon and reach a comprehensive ceasefire backed by the United Nations. The 
resolution was of course rejected by the US and Israel. Many Lebanese accused the US 
government of stalling the ceasefire resolution and of supporting Israel’s attacks. After the attack 
on Qana, Siniora cancelled a scheduled meeting with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
and thanked Hezbullah for its “sacrifices for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon.” 
This was only the beginning of what would become major political turmoil in Lebanon…. both 
on a domestic and international level. 
The United States has supported Israel since 1948 and has long supported the sovereignty 
of the State of Israel, specifically after the Cold War period. The United States fully integrated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 United Nations Security Council Resolution Number 1701.  
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Israel in its strategies and began its economic and military assistance after the war. Still, after the 
end of the Cold War and regardless of the changing in the security circumstances and the change 
in the world’s power, the United States continued to support Israel. The U.S.-Israeli relationship 
reached its climax in 1984 after the establishment of the Memorandum of Understanding that 
augments the strategic and military cooperation between the two states; three years later Israel 
became a member of NATO. Still, this relationship had its impediments delineated in the post-
Cold War era as tensions between Greater Israel and the Palestinian intifada increased (Barnett, 
400-447). 
The United States and Israel believe that radical Islam is their enemy and view Hezbullah 
as a major threat in the region. Thus, the United States added Hezbollah as one of the main 
terrorist groups on the United States’ list of “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (Slavin, 9). 
Former U.S. President, George W. Bush and his administration had plans for a ‘new’ Middle 
East. The disarmament of Hezbullah and the collapse of the Lebanese state, would have allowed 
the United States and Israel to control Lebanon and use it in the geopolitical context against 
important Iran. Throughout the July War, Condoleezza Rice made many visits to both Israel and 
Lebanon, but her position was made very clear—she supported the Israeli attacks on Lebanon, so 
long as Hezbullah remained armed and running as a movement. Her bias position and comments 
referring to the war as ‘marking the birth pangs of a new Middle East’ shattered any credibility 
the U.S. had throughout the Middle East (Sultan 2008, 44). 
As previously acknowledged, the 2006 July War on Lebanon was a direct result of the 
capture of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbullah. Israel’s response to this incident: thirty-four days of 
non-stop bombardment, devastation and mass destruction amongst the Lebanese people and 
Lebanon’s infrastructure. According to many experts, the 2006 war on Lebanon was a pre-
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determined act that had been in the works for about a year. The kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers 
was used as the IDF’s alibi, but Israel’s true aim was to destroy Hezbullah and force its 
disarmament (El-Khadem, 2007, 9). After Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, gave the Israeli 
Air Force the green light to begin its attacks on Lebanon, the destruction began immediately. On 
July 12, 2006 the IAF launched what is referred to as the ‘Massacre of Bridges’ (Ibid, 11) and 
thus began the brutal strikes on Lebanon and its people. The second day of the war was perhaps 
one of the most distinct, due to the closing of the Beirut airport and the bombing of the 
international access road to Syria; the longest and highest bridge in the Middle East was bombed 
and the IDF had placed Lebanon under a complete blockade—land, sea and air. The Lebanese 
government called upon the United Nations Security Council to implement an immediate 
ceasefire and call for the removal of the blockade on Lebanon. The United States, however, 
“considered Israel’s military operation as self-defense and a legitimate action to release the two 
abducted soldiers. Meanwhile, the European Union positively stated that the Israeli excessive use 
of force in Lebanon is not appropriate in retaliation to Hezbullah’s attacks” (Ibid, 18). After all, 
the bombing of an entire country in retaliation for the kidnappings of two soldiers is a bit 
extreme, is it not? 
A few days after war broke out in Lebanon, numerous countries called upon the US to 
initiate peace talks to end the fighting. Condolezza Rice, however, stated that a  
“ceasefire should be put off until the conditions are conducive” (Hersh 2006). The Bush 
Administration was actively involved in the “planning of Israel’s retaliatory attacks. President 
Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were convinced….that a successful Israeli Air Force 
bombing campaign against Hezbullah heavily fortified underground-missile and command-and-
control complexes in Lebanon could ease Israel’s security concerns” (Hersh). 
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 During the first three days of the war, the IAF had targeted all of Hezbullah’s main 
weapons collections, but only destroyed about seven percent of the movement’s actual weapons 
collections. These bunkers had been identified through “signal intercepts from Hezbullah 
communications, satellite-reconnaissance, photos from drone aircraft and from a network of 
trusted-human sources recruited by Israeli intelligence officers living in Southern Lebanon, 
including a large number of foreign nationals registered as guest workers” (Sultan, 34). This war 
was unlike any of the previous wars—this war was full of “surprises and deceptions” (El-
Khadem). Timur Goksel, Senior Advisor and Spokesman for the United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon provided a very clear evaluation of the events that had just taken place: 
The idea behind causing such horrific damage to civilian infrastructure was to convince 
the population to turn on Hezbullah. In practice, the opposite happened. After the attacks 
there was disquiet among groups in Lebanon about Hezbullah’s kidnapping of the Israeli 
soldiers. Now people are shocked and enraged that the US has given the green light to 
destroy their country. They’re shocked to think that they’re friends-the US, France, Saudi 
Arabia-are colluding with Israel to destroy Lebanon….I have been in countless hours of 
meetings with some of the Hezbullah leaders. I can guarantee that they would have 
welcomed a quiet dialogue with the United States. We don’t do our fundamental 
homework anymore. You’ve got to empathize with the enemy to the extent that you don’t 
see your enemy as a cartoon character but someone who might be smarter than anybody 
in your administration (Sultan, 34-35). 
 
Both Israel and Hezbullah miscalculated the force that would be used against one another. The 
capabilities that Hezbullah had under its hand were a complete shock to the Israeli government, 
just as the amount of force Israel used against Lebanon was mind-blowing to the Lebanese 
government. 
After weeks of unending violence and the loss of thousands of lives, mainly Lebanese, 
the United Nations issued a ceasefire resolution (UN Resolution 1701), which was agreed upon 
on August 13, 2006, by the Israeli government, Hezbullah and the Lebanese government. All 
attacks, by both sides, ended on August 13, 2006 at eight am (Sultan, 110). Although Israel was 
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unable to fulfill its immediate goal of destroying Hezbullah and weakening the Lebanese 
government, it was able to destroy Lebanon’s infrastructure, leaving thousands of Lebanese 
civilians displaced and performed numerous massacres throughout the country.  
Hezbullah on the other hand, completely shocked Israel with the amount of rockets they 
had under their control; around 4000 rockets were fired on Israel (Ibid, 103). Israeli Prime 
Minister, Ehud Olmert, was inexperienced in matters of defense and thus completely unfit to 
make any declarations of war on a country. The Israeli government completely miscalculated 
Hezbullah’s retaliation abilities and was under the false impression that the IAF was more than 
enough to destroy the Hezbullah movement. As a result of its decision to attack Lebanon, Israel 
lost any deterrence power it previously had. The massacres that took place on innocent Lebanese 
civilians, along with the “excessive use of fires provoked strong international condemnations to 
the amok behavior and uncontrollable conduct of the IDF. Returning to the IDF the power of 
deterrence was unreachable and beyond expectation” (Ibid, 105).  
Despite the thousands of Lebanese lives that were lost during the war and the mass 
destruction to Lebanon’s infrastructure, Hezbullah came out of the war as the ‘victorious’ ones. 
Israel suffered unimaginable casualties and deaths, achieved virtually none of the initial goals it 
originally had in mind, increased the Palestinian morale and Hezbullah’s acts during the July 
War, and also encouraged Palestinians to launch homemade rockets against Israel. The number 
of UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon was also increased, which was a disadvantage to the IDF, 
as they never viewed UNIFIL as a positive involvement, as their presence along the Israeli 
border limited the IDF’s ability to act freely (Ibid, 111-113). The July 2006 War was yet another 
attempt by Israel and the United States to subdue Lebanon and use it to their advantage, placing 
it under their wing. 
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3.5 Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, as briefly mentioned earlier in this chapter, was 
established through an agreement made between Lebanon and the United Nations. Its main 
initiative is to “hold trials for the people accused of carrying out the attack of 14 February 2005 
which killed 23 people, including the former prime minister of Lebanon…” (STL website). The 
main incentive behind its creation was due to the controversy over the legitimacy of the 
Lebanese investigation into Hariri’s assassination. The STL was not officially established until 
March 1, 2009, four years after the assassination took place. A series of events occurred prior to 
its formation, including the 2006 July War.  
 On April 7, 2005, the United Nations established the International Independent 
Investigation Commission, under UN Resolution 1595. The UNIIIC was designed to help aid 
Lebanese authorities in the investigation on Hariri’s death and would provide assistance in 
seeking out the persons responsible for the attack, conspirators and anyone involved with the 
assassination, directly and indirectly. The detainment of the four pro-Syrian generals in August 
of that same year sparked even greater controversy amongst the opposition. The former generals 
were incarcerated for nearly four years without being charged. Later that year, Ghazi Kanaan, the 
Syrian interior Minister, committed suicide. There were large speculations that he was involved 
with Hariri’s death. A few days later, the UNIIIC filed its first report which stated that there was 
“converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement” in Hariri’s death 
(Daily Star: Timeline of STL). 
 Following the 2006 July War, tensions escalated within the Lebanese government over 
the formation of the STL and Fouad Siniora’s cabinet collapsed. The depleted cabinet went on to 
approve a draft for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and in May 2007 the United Nations 
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Security Council supported the establishment of the STL, under the condition that Lebanon must 
pay forty-nine percent of the court’s costs. It would be almost two years later before the STL 
would convene for its first meeting in the Hague on March 1, 2009. The first major decision 
taken by the STL prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, was to release the four generals from prison. The 
next two and a half years would be a constant debacle between the STL and those opposed to the 
tribunal, mainly the March 8 alliance. In the summer 2010, Hezbullah secretary general, Sayyed 
Hassan Nasrallah, released a statement informing the public that the STL would falsely accuse 
members of Hezbullah as being responsible for the attack. Later that summer, Nasrallah accused 
Israel of being responsible for Hariri’s death and released video evidence to the public, 
indicating that Israeli spies were closely monitoring Hariri’s activities and frequent commuting 
routes. In September 2010, Saad Al-Hariri released a public apology saying that he was wrong in 
accusing Syria of his father’s death and the charge against Syria was simply a political assertion. 
With the credibility of the STL slowly deteriorating amongst Lebanese people, tensions within 
Saad Al-Hariri’s cabinet continued to escalate, leading to yet another collapse of the Lebanese 
parliament, after March 8 ministers resigned from parliament. 
 Daniel Bellemare issued a copy of the STL’s indictment to the court in January 2011; 
however, it would take six months before Prime Minister Najib Mikati forms a Lebanese 
government. Soon after the formation of the Lebanese cabinet, Bellemare issues an indictment to 
Lebanese officials, accusing four Hezbullah members in the assassination of Rafik Al-Hariri. 
The four suspects were publicly identified as Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, 
Hussein Hassan Oneissi and Assad Hassan Sabra. Sayed Hassan Nasrallah responded to the 
indictment, by informing the STL and the international community that these men will not be 
arrested. To date, the suspects have yet to be detained by Lebanese authorities. In September of 
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this year, Prime Minister Mikati flew to New York to partake in UN Security Council sessions, 
in order to discuss Lebanon’s financial obligations to the STL. After much scrutiny and warnings 
of facing international sanctions, Lebanon and Mikati’s government paid over $30 million to the 
STL. The STL today is still undergoing investigations dealing with the killings of Marwan 
Hamade, Elias Murr and George Hawi. The tribunal also awaits the detention of the four 
Hezbullah suspects and is considering trying the suspects “in absentia”, (meaning that they 
would be tried in court without being physically present), should Lebanese officials fail to locate 
the individuals.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
Tensions between the Hezbullah/March 8 alliance and March 14 alliance and Israel 
remain high. UNIFIL, the Lebanese government and Hezbullah continue their attempts to act 
simultaneously, hand-in-hand to prevent any future Israeli attacks from taking place. The 
intelligence failure on the part of the Israeli government tarnished its image greatly and will take 
years to overcome. Following the war, Hezbullah took many steps to ensure that its strength 
would continue to grow on both a public and political level. The July War strengthened 
Hezbullah both militarily and domestically; the support for the movement increased 
tremendously and continues to grow today. 
The election of Najib Mikati’s Lebanese cabinet sparked great concern for the United 
States. The cabinet, which is mainly composed of March 8 and Hezbullah allies, makes it more 
difficult for the United States to continue its spoiler role. The United States’ democracy 
promotion agenda in Lebanon was long ago figured out as a cover up for a “sinister plot to 
relocate Lebanon from one regional camp to another” (Salloukh 2009, 134). The pressure has 
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now shifted to Lebanon’s neighbor, Syria, where the United States has placed sanctions on the 
country and is working in favor of the revolution that is taking place to overthrow current Syrian 
president, Bashar Al-Assad. The current situation in Syria directly affects Lebanon. The civil 
strife in Lebanon has been a continuous battle that seems to be growing stronger and stronger 
with each passing day. Where this civil strife will lead the Lebanese population and when it will 
end, are questions that can only be answered with time. When faced with the reality of the 
situation, Lebanon is seen as a ticking time bomb that is seconds away from erupting. 
“Washington’s spoiler role exposed the false promises of its democracy promotion agenda in the 
Middle East and the destructive ‘birth pangs of a new Middle East,’ to quote Condoleezza Rice’s 
disturbing phrase. Washington is thus no different than Tehran or Damascus in using Lebanon as 
a site for proxy confrontations” (Ibid, 145). 
With the creation of the new Lebanese cabinet in June 2010, headed by Najib Mikati, the 
United States government passed the Anti-Hezbullah Act, cutting off funding to Lebanon; the 
US reacted the same way in 2006 when Hamas defeated Fatah in Palestine. These legislative 
actions further support the argument that the United States does not truly have an interest in 
implementing democracy in the region, especially when the end result is not to their liking. 
When it comes to the state of Israel, on the other hand, it is strongly supported and assisted by 
the United States, providing it with almost three billion dollars per year in the last three decades 
and promised to achieve aid for the next decade in 2007 (Slavin, 9). Supporting the Zionist 
Israeli regime is a support to anti-Islam by the United States to face its Islamic enemy and the 
Islamic countries that pose a threat to the United States.2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 “Paper terms US ‘Number One Enemy’ of Iran.” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 22 November 2009. 
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The 2006 War overall further exemplifies how the United States used Lebanon to gain 
further geopolitical strength in the region. Since Israel had to withdraw from the country in 2000, 
the United States had lost its ability to control any part of the country or weaken Hezbullah. With 
Syria’s presence in the country, the United States was growing more and more weary and felt 
threatened by the Iran-Syria-Hezbullah alliance. The neoconservative advisors on Bush’s team 
felt certain that this war would destroy Hezbullah and weaken its strength throughout the country 
and the region. Little did Washington know that Hezbullah only gained support and strength, 
post 2006 war, with Syria being one of its greatest allies and arms suppliers. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE US AND THE ARAB UPRISINGS: 
SYRIA AND BAHRAIN COMPARED 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2011, the United States launched the 
“War on Terror” - an international military campaign originally intended to eliminate Al-Qaeda 
and other terrorist organizations considered to be threats to the security of the United States. The 
war on terror soon developed into an ideological fig leaf to hound unfriendly states. As American 
neoconservatives put their philosophy into practice, the results have included the invasions of, 
and insurgencies in, Iraq and Afghanistan, drone strikes throughout Central Asia and the Middle 
East, and crippling damage to Al-Qaeda. The war on terror has also had specific consequences 
for many Middle Eastern states, including Syria. But the Arab uprisings soon unmasked 
Washington’s true intentions in the region. Faced with a national, democratic, and inclusive 
uprising in Bahrain, the US opted to support an authoritarian regime rather than the democratic 
aspirations of a people wanting to live in freedom. This chapter unpacks US foreign policy in 
Syria and Bahrain, demonstrating how Washington supports regime change that serves its own 
geopolitical interests. The interests of the peoples, however, assumes only a secondary place in 
Washington’s calculations. 
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4.2 U.S.-Syria Relations: 1990s to Present Day 
 Throughout the 1990s, the relationship between Syria and the U.S. was characterized by 
tremendous initial promise followed by a long deterioration.  Syria made a ‘strategic decision’ to 
oppose Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and to join the Coalition forces led by the U.S. The Syrians 
threw their support behind Washington, believing that the U.S. would trigger an Israeli-Syrian 
settlement that returned the Golan Heights to Syria. Syria and the United States were brought 
together during the Madrid Peace Process in 1990. However, when the Clinton-Assad summit in 
2000 failed along with the Syrian-Israeli peace process, U.S.-Syrian relations declined. Relations 
worsened when the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003. The decline stemmed from disagreements over 
five major issues (Hinnebusch 2005): the collapse of the Arab-Israeli (and Syrian-Israeli) peace 
process; the rise of neo-conservatism in Washington; the terrorist attacks of 11 September; 
Syrian alignment with Iraq, and Syrian resistance to the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
 In 2000, President Hafiz al-Assad passed away and his son, Bashar Al-Assad, ascended 
to the nation’s presidency. Soon after, Iraq turned to Syria in order to escape United Nations 
(U.N.) sanctions. As a result, Syria and Iraq began a process of reconciliation with the intent of 
amending ties between the two countries - ties that had been greatly damaged by the Syrians 
siding with the U.S. during the Gulf War. To make this resurgent relationship more meaningful, 
al-Assad decided to re-open the oil pipeline from Iraq to Syria’s Banias port - a port on the 
Mediterranean offering the Iraqis another avenue to export oil through. Concurrently, in the U.S., 
George W. Bush won a hotly contested election in 2000. The world may be very different had Al 
Gore become the 43rd American president. However, Bush was president for not just one but 
two terms and because of his victory, neo-conservatism became the dominant theory among 
American leadership. 
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To recap neo-conservatism’s core characteristics, these include the following: Moralism - 
 all states, individuals, and ideas along with everything else is either good or evil; 
internationalism - Neoconservatives belief threats should be confronted early before they 
metastasize into a threat directly to the American homeland; a belief in the efficacy of military 
force - Neoconservatives believe that force is an option of first resort rather than last resort when 
it comes to solving international disputes; and, finally, the belief in democracy promotion, even 
by force, because democracy is naturally good and enhances American security. 
 It did not take long for neo-conservatism to influence American policy towards Syria. 
Once President Bush was elected, neo-conservatism’s moralism, internationalism, belief in the 
efficacy of military force and belief in democracy came to the fore of American foreign policy. 
Each of these characteristics can be observed in Washington’s relationship with Damascus and 
help us to understand the years between 2001 and 2008.  
 First, consider neoconservative’s strong belief in democracy. As John Mearsheimer 
argued in 2005, neoconservatives believe that “if every state looked like democratic America, 
which is obviously a virtuous state, we would live in a world of all white hats and no black hats, 
which, by definition, would be a peaceful world” (Mearsheimer 2005). Hence, the U.S. will 
always support Israel. The thinking is quite simple. Israel is a democracy. Democracy is good. 
Therefore, Israel must be good as well. That Syria poses a threat to Israel – especially the threat 
posed via Hezbollah - immediately cast Syria in a negative light in the eyes of the Bush 
administration.  
 Second, consider neoconservative moralism. On January 29, 2002, President Bush 
declared that Iran, Iraq and North Korea were the Axis of Evil - rogue states that flouted 
international norms by supporting violent extremism and pursuing weapons of mass destruction. 
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By 2002, Syria was already rebuilding its relationship with Iraq and was an ally of Iran since 
1979. Such close relationships with two states expressly declared to be part of the Axis of Evil 
again did not help Syria’s relationship with the U.S (Hinnebusch 2013).  
 Third, the U.S. behaved in an extremely bellicose manner after Baghdad’s fall of April 9, 
2003. Mearsheimer notes that the Bush administration was making it clear in the days before the 
Iraqi insurgency that it intended to transform the Middle East through force of arms. With their 
religious belief in democracy, neoconservatives believed that democracy would simply sprout up 
in the absence of tyrannical dictators (Mearsheimer 2005). In this behavior, we see both the 
neoconservative belief in democracy and neoconservative internationalism. The idea was to 
crush any and all threats to the U.S. before they had a chance to metastasize. In other words, the 
U.S. sought not just hegemony but domination. That domination, neoconservatives believed, 
could be achieved through the use of America’s overwhelming military power; thus illustrating 
neo-conservatism’s belief in the efficacy of military force as an option of first rather than last 
resort. 
 Since 2003, the relationship between Syria and the U.S. has continued to deteriorate.  
The U.S., the straw that broke the relationship was the American invasion of Iraq. On the eve of 
the American invasion, Syrian foreign minister Farouk al-Sharaa told the Syrian Parliament that 
“the U.S. was going to war in defiance of international law and the U.N. and that Syria had a 
national interest in the defeat of the invaders.” Syria, while not actively opposing the American 
invasion, certainly did not welcome it (Hinnebusch 2013).  
 Following the 2005 assassination of Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Syria 
was placed under increased scrutiny. Increasingly reliant upon Iran, Syria became something of a 
pariah state. Their deepening cooperation increased tensions throughout the Middle East and 
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complicated the relationship between Damascus and Washington. The Americans, viewing both 
Iran and Syria as “rogue states”, saw both states as having “formed a mutual self-defense pact to 
confront the ‘threats’ now facing them” in the region (MacAskill and Campbell, 2005).  
 Beginning in 2003, insurgents began using Syria as a conduit to reach Iraq. At the same 
time, Baathists fled Iraq and found safe havens in eastern Syria. Establishing a new base to train, 
raise funds, and obtain weapons in Syria free of harassment from U.S. forces was vital to the 
insurgency’s success. Syria had two major incentives to allow insurgents to base themselves in 
Syria. First, it was a convenient way to get rid of insurgents. Second, by tying U.S. forces down 
in Iraq and preventing the rise of a democratic Iraq allied with the U.S., the al-Assad regime kept 
the U.S. from intervening within Syria itself. Syria’s involvement in Iraq earned it successive 
mentions in quarterly reports by the U.S. Department of Defense. The success of Syria’s strategy 
was also predicted to blowback on the al-Assad regime just a few years later (Tanter and 
Kiersting, 2009).   
 
4.3 Syria: Spring 2011 
 Bashar Al-Asaad was always liked more than his father was by the Western allies and 
those in the Middle Eastern region. Originally viewed as an enlightened Arab leader, al-Assad 
was educated in the West. In fact, he had no intentions of entering political life. His father Hafez 
had been preparing al-Assad’s brother Basel for Syria’s presidency. In 1994, Basel was killed in 
a car crash. Quickly, Bashar was recalled to Syria and was groomed to take his father’s place. At 
age 34, Bashar al-Assad became Syria’s president in 2000.Hopes were high for Assad. He stated 
early in his presidency that democracy is “a tool to a better life” but that it could not be rushed in 
Syria. In the meantime, al-Assad promised reform and sought to modernize Syria (Khalaf 2012).  
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 However, in order to maintain the Assad regime’s strong rule and power and protect the 
Alawite minority in the country, Bashar maintained a tight grip over Syria and its people. When 
the Arab Spring first erupted in Tunisia and Ben Ali was overthrown, Bashar stated the following 
in an interview with The Wall Street Journal after being asked whether he thought there were 
reforms he should accelerating in light of events in Egypt and Tunisia: 
If you did not see the need for reform before what happened in Egypt and in 
Tunisia, it is too late to do any reform. This is first. Second, if you do it just 
because of what happened in Tunisia and Egypt, then it is going to be a reaction, 
not an action; and as long as what you are doing is a reaction you are going to fail 
(Al-Assad 2011). 
 
 Just a few months later, it became clear that al-Assad had not moved fast enough on 
reforms. In March 2011, Syrians took to the streets to bring about economic and political change. 
During the protests, a group of children were arrested for political graffiti. Refusing to release 
the children, al-Assad chose to use force to end the protests, suspended constitutional protections 
–banning rallies, restricting the press, and using violence and detentions to crackdown on the 
protests. On April 17, 2011, al-Assad sent forces into the main square of Homs to end a peaceful 
sit-in protest. 62 people were killed. Violence quickly spun out of control. Throughout the 
following months, violence tore Syria apart. The battle centered upon the city of Homs, which 
became known as the birthplace of the Syrian revolution. The city has changed hands multiple 
times as residents have fled in droves (Walker 2013). 
 
4.4 The Syrian Opposition 
  In November 2012, opposition forces coalesced into the National Coalition of Syrian 
Revolution and Opposition Forces (NCR). The goal of the NCR is to establish an executive 
ranch that: unifies support for the joint leadership of the military council, revolutionary council 
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and the Free Syrian Army; generates funding to support the Syrian people via international 
coordination; creates a Syrian National Legal Committee and establishes a transitional 
government after receiving international recognition. Ultimately, the goal of the NCR is simply 
stated as the overthrow of the al-Assad regime followed by a transition towards a free and 
democratic country. As of December 2012, over 130 countries recognized the NCR as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Syrian people (NCR 2013).  
 The NCR is supported by the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The FSA is estimated to be 
50,000 to 100,000 strong. The FSA mostly consists of former Syrian police officers and soldiers 
along with citizens who have taken up arms against the al-Assad regime. However, to refer to the 
FSA as an army is being generous. It is a group that lacks central coordination and control. 
Often, it consists of small groups of men who have chosen to fight (Childress 2012).  
 However, also opposing the al-Assad regime is a large contingent of foreign fighters. 
This is the potential blowback mentioned by Tanter and Kersting in Syria’s Role in the Iraq 
Insurgency (2009). Foreign fighters, fresh with experience in the Iraq war, have come to Syria to 
take advantage of the Syrian Civil War with the hope of becoming the dominant force shaping a 
new Syria. The most notorious group of foreign fighters is the jihadi group Jabhat al-Nursa. The 
group, closely affiliated with Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, merged with Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq to form the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIGS) in April 2013 (Fishman 2013). 
Foreign fighters affiliated with groups such as ISIGS are known to be fierce fighters who utilize 
suicide attacks. Their ranks are estimated to exceed 6,000 foreigners (Schmitt 2013). 
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4.5 The Lack of an American Response? 
 The conventional wisdom is that the U.S. lacks anything resembling a good option in 
Syria. The U.S. cannot directly intervene, even if it wanted to, for a host of international and 
domestic political reasons. The response to another American military action in the Middle East 
would almost assuredly receive a negative reception internationally, especially in the Muslim 
world and at home. There are also numerous financial reasons as to why the U.S. will not seek 
another Middle Eastern war. Finally, history shows – especially the histories of Iraq and 
Afghanistan - that it is very difficult to successfully end violence using military force. Even the 
middle ground of arming the Syrian opposition friendly to the U.S. is problematic. 
 President Obama’s conflicting impulses have not helped. In August 2011, President 
Obama declared that Al-Assad must give up power. Yet, Obama did not follow that 
pronouncement up with aid for the Syrian opposition beyond freezing Syrian assets with 
American jurisdiction, banning Syrian oil imports, and barring Americans from doing business 
with the Syrian government (Myers 2011). The lack of American involvement has been a source 
of difficulty for the Syrian opposition since the war began.  
 It was not until April 2013 that Obama signed a secret order authorizing the Central 
Intelligence agency to arm Syrian rebels. However, the arms did not ship until August – after a 
deadly chemical weapons attack by the al-Assad regime on rebel forces also killed scores of 
civilians in a Damascus suburb. That crisis brought the U.S. to the precipice of military action 
until Syria offered to give up its chemical weapons in return for the U.S. restraining from 
airstrikes.  Now that the U.S. is arming the opposition, there are concerns that U.S. weapons will 
fall into the hands of Al-Qaeda and other violent extremists (Mazzetti and Worth 2013).  All 
told, the American response looks muddled, confused and powerless.  
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 However, there is another line of thought that is decidedly realist. Denis McDonough, the 
U.S. deputy national security adviser, was promoted to White House chief of staff in February 
2013. The status quo in Syria, argued McDonough, is strategically advantageous to the U.S. It 
keeps Iran pinned down and raises the possibility of a fight between Syria and Hezbollah – a 
fight that would be fortuitous for the U.S. (Mazzetti and Worth 2013). That fight would be 
especially fortuitous from a realist perspective as there is nothing better than letting one enemy 
battle another. Such a line of thinking being adopted by a U.S. president would be a dramatic 
departure from what Tom Switzer calls “superpower syndrome” – the idea that Washington 
should “adopt a policy of indiscriminate global intervention (Switzer 2013). If this is the case, 
expect Washington to take actions that prolong the conflict at little to no cost to itself and its vital 
interests. 
 
4.6 The Importance of Bahrain 
Bahrain has been ruled by the Al-Khalifa family since 1783, long before it became an 
independent state in 1971. Two years after its independence, Bahrain held its first elections; this 
would last for two years, before the constitution and government were dissolved in 1975. There 
have been sporadic uprisings since then and an increase in the number of opposition groups; 
however, any attempts to revolt or protest against the monarchy are quickly crushed by the pro-
government security forces. Since the constitution was dissolved in 1975, there have been major 
human rights violations carried out throughout the country. There was a short period of time 
when Amnesty International praised Bahrain for its reforms and improvement in human rights 
practices. This, however, was short-lived and the government resorted back to its old practices of 
torture and repression. By 2010, the Human Rights Watch described Bahrain’s human rights 
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record as dismal. Bahrain’s majority Shia population has historically and constantly been 
discriminated against for jobs and housing, while non-Bahraini Sunnis are naturalized, granted 
citizenship and provided with employment. 
Most of the human rights violations, the torture, the repression, gerrymandering and 
systemic discrimination, to name a few, were rarely discussed or brought to the Western media’s 
attention, due to Bahrain’s tight relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia. The United 
States’ Naval Fifth Fleet is stationed in Bahrain and is viewed by the United States as an 
imperative strategic location in the attempt to oppose Iranian military power throughout the 
Middle Eastern region. The country is also a strong supporter of US arms sales. Bahrain, having 
a predominantly Shia population is being led by the Al Khalifa Sunni minority. Having Saudi 
Arabia and the United States’ support works strongly in their favor, as they claim the Shia 
opposition are being greatly influenced by Iranian forces. These claims, however, were found to 
be false based on an article in the Huffington Post, describing a government based commission 
report that lacked any evidence supporting these accusations. Seeing that Saudi Arabia is the 
most extremist country in the world, it is no surprise that they will support their fellow Sunnis, 
no matter what the cost; be it monetary value or the loss of lives. Their main concern is to 
maintain Sunni power wherever possible, especially in the form of a monarchy. 
The corruption and human rights violations within the Bahraini regime are at an all-time 
high. Based on a first-hand account of a Guardian reporter, medical staff in a major hospital in 
Manama were arrested and charged with taking sides with the opposition, if they were caught 
providing medical assistance to any of the injured protesters. The Bahraini regime was 
responsible for arresting, injuring, killing and terminating anti-regime supporters from their jobs. 
The same prime minister has been in power for over forty-two years and it was going to be 
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impossible for anti-monarchy citizens to get away with these acts of peaceful protests and 
demands for democracy, without having to suffer major consequences. On the eve before Saudi 
troops entered Bahrain, the protests were strictly peaceful and the activists were unarmed. 
 
4.7 Day of Rage: February 14, 2011 
 As uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia began growing in size and power, the Bahraini 
population began preparing for peaceful protests throughout the country. Social media such as 
Facebook played a great role in organizing the first protests on February 14, which were 
supposed to take place in Bahrain’s Pearl Roundabout. In the meantime, the Bahraini 
government introduced a fabricated PR campaign “to advertise reforms, while Shia protesters 
continued to clash nightly with riot police. The dominant narrative of the uprisings was written 
defiantly in the streets, but the regime’s fight back-a counter revolution-continued” (Manhire, 
2012). 
 The peaceful protests that were set-up in Bahrain’s Pearl Roundabout were violently 
crushed by the regime’s security forces. One of the protesters, Ali Abdulhadi Maushaima, was 
killed during the first attacks and clashes broke out during his funeral procession the following 
day. Protests continued at Pearl Square and the majority Shia protesters were peacefully chanting 
“No Sunnis, No Shias, we are all Bahrainis”. Protesters renamed Pearl Square as the “Nation’s 
Square” (Manhire:2012). Despite their attempts to carry out peaceful protests, the regime’s 
security forces continued using violent tactics to crush the uprisings; they attached the protesters 
using rubber bullets and tear gas. In an attempt to cover-up their actions, members of the 
Bahraini government appeared on the news channels stating that “Pearl Square has been cleared 
after trying full opportunities for dialogue”. The reality of the situation was, however, that there 
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was no opportunity for dialogue whatsoever. There was, rather, a terrorist attack carried out on 
the peaceful Bahraini protesters. One of the Guardian’s reporter’s, Martin Chulov, provided a 
first-hand account from Bahrain’s SMC hospital where “the lead trauma surgeon was tied up, 
assaulted and placed in intensive care….the attacks were carried out from every direction and the 
tents they had set-up were cut through with knives” (Manhire:2012). Any doctors that were seen 
assisting or nursing the wounded protesters were arrested on counts of supporting the opposition 
in an attempt to overthrow the regime. 
 As attacks and protests continued, the Bahraini regime remained intact, unshaken, with 
an iron fist. The Obama Administration paid little attention to the violence taking place in the 
country, due to its alliance with the Bahraini regime and its alliance with Saudi Arabia. The 
media continued to display false coverage of the events. Top-notch officials resigned from news 
stations, such as Al Jazeera. The Managing Director and Correspondent, as well as the Head of 
the Beirut Bureau, resigned from Al Jazeera’s Beirut office, due to the bias of the news channel. 
Ghassan Ben Jeddo, the head of the Beirut Bureau, released a statement following his 
resignation: “I do believe that Al Jazeera and other channels were not balanced in dealing with 
the events. For instance, with respect to the events in Syria and Bahrain, we started to invite 
guests from America who only criticize the regime in Syria and support the regime in Bahrain 
and persons who justify NATO intervention. This is unacceptable” (Al Jazeera Exodus). 
 
4.8 The US-Bahrain-Saudi Alliance 
Despite the prejudice of the numerous news stations, the US-Saudi-Bahraini alliance was 
impossible to overlook. Saudi Arabia sent 1,000 troops into Bahrain, along with security forces 
from other GCC member states, such as the United Arab Emirates. The forces crushed the 
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protests and forced the protesters out of Pearl Square, destroying the Pearl Monument. The 
following day, on March 15, 2011, the Bahraini regime declared a state of emergency (The 
Nation). Saudi Arabia justified its intervention into Bahrain as a means to end the revolution 
awakened and supported by Iran to overthrow the Sunni led regime. Saudi Arabia’s main 
purpose was to protect the monarchy. The sectarian strife in Bahrain had an influence and effect 
on Saudi Arabia “exciting opposition within the Shia community in the Eastern province, but 
preservation of the Bahraini monarchical system, even at the expense of possible problems with 
their own sectarian minority at home, trumped all considerations for Riyadh” (Gause:2011). 
Saudi Arabia continues to be a major source of financial support for the Bahraini monarchy 
today. This source of support was a major reason why Saudi Arabia felt entitled to intrude within 
Bahraini soil when the protests erupted. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 The world, especially the Middle East and most especially Syria, lacks stability – even a 
sense of it. Irrational decisions stemming from the Bush administration’s neoconservative policy 
have led to an increase in tensions around the world. Iran pursues a nuclear weapon to protect 
itself from the U.S., Syria is embroiled in a civil war that threatens to spill over into neighboring 
states, and the democratic promise of the Arab Spring is fading as authoritarianism retains its 
grip on power via violence.  
 In many ways, the U.S. is at fault for allowing these events to unfold. The invasion of 
Iraq – an invasion that was deceitfully sold to the American people by the Bush administration – 
set off a bloodletting; the consequences of which are reshaping the Middle East. Bogus claims of 
Iraq supporting Al-Qaeda were used to win the support of Congress to authorize the use of 
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military force against Iraq. However, Iraq was in no way connected to the 11 September attacks 
on the U.S. by Al-Qaeda. To say that it is unfortunate that the American system of checks and 
balances failed miserably would be an understatement. The politics of fear overshadowed reality.  
Sadly, the damage has been done. As Jeremy Pressman wrote in Power Without Influence: The 
Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East (2009), “the benefits were 
more limited than expected; the costs were higher than anticipated; and the damage in terms of 
national security and international relationship was to both the United States and its allies greater 
than ever imagined.”  
 Thus far, more than 126,000 people have died in Syria’s civil war (Reuters 2013). 
Estimates suggest that 5,000 people died in September 2013 alone. All told, 23,000, 41,000 
civilians (including 6,000 children and 4,000 women), and 47,000 soldiers and militia fighters 
loyal to the al-Assad regime have died (Solomon2013). The long term consequences of the 
conflict are not yet known and the violence still seems far from over. However, it is clear that the 
al-Assad regime will at the very least be severely diminished and that no one – especially the 
Syrian people - will emerge from the conflict as the indisputable victor.  
 As far as the U.S. is concerned, most observers agree that the U.S. would prefer for Syria 
to become a free and democratic nation. Failing that, prolonged fighting in Syria favors 
America’s geostrategic position in the Middle East because it keeps America’s enemies busy 
killing each other rather than combatting the U.S. That their enemies are bitterly divided may 
ultimately be the saving grace for the U.S. and its allies. However, such cold blooded realism is 
not without its costs and it does make it clear that – when push comes to shove – the U.S., like 
any great power, will be more concerned with its power than its ideals. 
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 In Bahrain a different scenario transpired. The initial uprising proved that not everyone 
was satisfied with the monarchy and the rules set in place. Gulf rulers, in general, however have 
a tough time trying to steer clear of following the trend of social and economic changes. The 
Gulf area experienced its first indication of “economic globalization” in the nineteenth century, 
when foreign powers became dominant players within the country. In the case of Bahrain, the 
United States and Saudi Arabia were major players. As James Schlesinger, former US secretary 
of state once put it “an even deeper question is whether we seriously desire or prescribe 
democracy as the proper form of government for other societies. Perhaps the issue is more 
clearly posed in the Islamic world. Do we seriously want to change the institutions of Saudi 
Arabia? The brief answer is no” (Salloukh, 72). 
 The United States fully supports the Bahraini monarchy and not only has placed its 
headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet there, but also signed a free trade agreement with Bahrain in 
2006. This trade agreement represented Washington’s full support for the Al Khalifa family, 
which was evident in the 2011 uprisings and continues to be the case today. Following the 
violence that erupted in the 90’s, Sheikh Hamad came to power and promised many reforms and 
changes for the Bahraini people. There were certain changes that did indeed occur, however the 
major power making decisions and electoral representation were actually becoming worse. King 
Hamad consolidated political power, leaving all decision-making powers in his hands and in the 
hands of those he elected himself. The United States continued to show great support for its 
Bahraini ally and saw the monarch as a great protector from Iranian influence and power. 
Bahrain is a perfect case, which further proves that the United States is extremely biased in its 
foreign policy decisions. It will support regime change in those countries where the rulers do not 
work in the good of Washington’s social and economic interests, crushing the existing regimes 
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and implementing its own “democratic” façade. However, in countries such as Bahrain, where 
the rulers work in the interest of Washington’s geopolitical wants, these rulers will live 
peacefully and happily, without having to worry about US or Western forces working with the 
opposition, to overthrow the regime. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION: 
IN THE US, WE DO NOT TRUST! 
 
 
5.1 Summing Up 
 This thesis examined the United States government’s true interest in implementing 
democracy throughout the Middle East, specifically through the 2006 Lebanese-Israeli War and 
the revolutions of the Arab Spring that arose in 2011. As Condoleezza Rice announced to the 
world in 2006, the Lebanese-Israeli War was leading way for “the birth pangs of a new Middle 
East” (Shambayati). What she and fellow neocons had in mind at the time was to implement an 
American hegemony in the region. This approach became more evident when the 2011 Arab 
uprisings commenced in the region. Where the United States once focused solely on changing 
certain policies within regimes, there was now a strong effort to change the regimes of those 
states that had challenged America’s hegemony in the region. In other words, it was US 
geopolitical interests, not the democratic aspirations of those peoples who demonstrated across 
the Arab world, that determined which authoritarian regimes collapsed and which ones survived 
the wave of the popular uprisings. 
Three cases were examined in this thesis to demonstrate the underlying determinants of 
Washington’s foreign policy in the Arab world. The first case involved Lebanon, where the quest 
to surround Syria and punish it in its own backyard drove US foreign policy in the country after 
Hariri’s assassination. The claims of the Cedar Revolution were a sideshow compared to 
Washington’s geopolitical interests. Then the thesis examined the cases of Syria and Bahrain 
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after the Arab uprisings. Here again geopolitical imperatives, rather than democratic principles, 
shaped US policies to the Arab uprisings. Washington’s policy toward Syria has been shaped by 
the fear of the consequences of regime change. This explains the checkered American approach 
to the Syrian uprising and its later transformation into a geopolitical war for Syria. Similarly, 
Bahrain’s pivotal position in Washington’s geopolitical calculations meant that the Obama 
administration largely ignored a non-violent and trans-sectarian democratic uprisings to turn a 
minority-based authoritarian regime into a majority based constitutional monarchy. 
 
5.2 Washington’s Decisions 
The US administration limited its democratization efforts to ‘technical’ programs that 
focused on building civil societies in the region while failing to tackle the structural problems of 
political power. The United States’ response to the Arab Spring proves that the United States is 
willing to promote democracy where it serves its interest and does not support the revolutions in 
areas where it does not serve its interest. Whether it be President Bush and his neoconservative 
team going into Iraq or supporting the 2006 Lebanese-Israeli War, or President Obama and his 
realist advisors in their inconsistent support for regime change throughout certain countries in the 
region, one thing is for sure, the US wants to “help keep longtime allies who are willing to 
reform in power, even if that means the full democratic demands of their newly emboldened 
citizens might have to wait” (Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2011) 
The American era was brought to an end due to numerous factors, some structural, some 
self-created. The most significant was the Bush administration’s decision to attack Iraq in 2003 
and its conduct of the operation and resulting occupation. One casualty of the war has been a 
Sunni dominated Iraq, which was strong enough and motivated enough to balance Shiite Iran. 
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Sunni-Shiite tensions, which remained dormant for quite some time, resurfaced in Iraq and 
throughout the region. Terrorists have gained a base in Iraq and developed there a new set of 
techniques to export. Throughout much of the region, democracy has become associated with the 
loss of public order and the end of Sunni primacy. Anti-American sentiments have been 
bolstered, and by tying down a mass percentage of the US military, the war has decreased US 
control worldwide. “It is one of history’s ironies that the first war in Iraq, a war of necessity, 
marked the beginning of the American era in the Middle East and the second Iraq war, a war of 
choice, has precipitated its end” (Haas, 14). 
 
5.3 Hope for the US? 
In order for the United States to have the slightest shot at gaining a minute amount of 
public support amongst the Arab states, the US must avoid making two major mistakes in the 
future. The first mistake would be an overreliance on military force. As the United States has 
learned to its great cost in Iraq, military force is not the answer. It is not terribly useful against 
loosely organized militias and terrorists who are well armed, accepted by the local population, 
and prepared to die for their cause. Nor would carrying out a preventive strike on Iranian nuclear 
installations accomplish much good. Not only might an attack fail to destroy all facilitires, but it 
might also lead Tehran to reconstitute its program even more covertly, cause Iranians to rally 
around the regime, and possibly even directly against the United States. Military action in Iran 
would also drive the price of oil to new heights, increasing the chances of an international 
economic crisis and a global recession. The second mistake the US needs to avoid is counting on 
the emergence of democracy to pacify the region. It is true that mature democracies tend not to 
wage war on one another; however, creating mature democracies is not a simple task. The United 
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States government must work with many nondemocratic governments. The fact that both Hamas 
and Hezbullah fared well in elections and then carried out violent attacks reinforces the point that 
democratic reform does not guarantee quiet. Initiatives that are more useful would be actions 
designed to reform educational systems, promote economic liberalization and open markets, 
encourage Arab and Muslim authorities to speak out in ways that delegitimize terrorism and 
shame its supporters. Any “democracy” imposed on the Arab states by the United States will not 
pacify the region. After all, this defeats the main idea behind a democracy: a government chosen 
by the people, not a government imposed on the people by outside parties (Haas, 14). 
“Democracy-building, Filippo Sabetti reminds us, requires a calculus of consent and 
commitment as well as love of country that cannot be imposed and must emerge from people 
willing to engage in a dialogue with one another and to practice the art of associating together” 
(Salloukh 2009, 147). 
There is no sense of stability in the world today. The irrational decisions made on behalf 
of the Bush administration during the 2003 invasion of Iraq have unfortunately led to an increase 
in terrorism, an increase in nuclear weapons building, and no hope for democracy in the region. 
The United States, as a nation, is at fault for allowing such deceit and hypocrisy to dominate its 
society. The American checks and balances system failed miserably and government officials 
and members of congress were bind sighted by the Bush administration’s foolishness. ‘Politics of 
fear’ overshadowed reality. The fact that Iraq was in no way related to the terrorist acts of 11 
September. The fact that North Korea had a real nuclear arms program in the works and the fact 
that Iran was willing to engage in diplomatic talks, further lead to an endless list supporting the 
theory that the Bush administration had no rational explanation for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
The damage has been done and sadly “the benefits were more limited than expected; the costs 
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were higher than anticipated; and the damage in terms of national security and international 
relationship was to both the United States and its allies” greater than ever imagined” (Pressman, 
156). 
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